On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as Like in Facebook, Favorite in Twitter, thumbsup/down, flagging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g. Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion) these mechanisms are not sufficient since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between different claims. We can view a set of conflicting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here, we present the first experimental evaluation of different aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which rules people consider better at aggregating opinions under different conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the efficacy of aggregation. These results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application.
INTRODUCTION
In many online systems that support Collective Intelligence (e.g. Wikipedia, question answering systems, and discussion forums) different conflicting points of view arise, even based on the same information [Apic et al. 2011; Marvel et al. 2011; Introne et al. 2011] . This raises the challenge of supporting consensus-making among community members. However, many systems on the Web employ arbitrary aggregation rules to handle such tasks, due to the lack of clear appropriate rule given the settings at hand, and the difficulty of evaluating the potential alternatives. Further, the scalability, and the complexity of consensus-making in online systems makes the use of traditional voting rules inadequate.
In order to address the challenging task of finding appropriate aggregation rules for systems as complex and scalable as those used on the Internet, one needs to consult the vast body of literature on voting and aggregation, starting with the establishment of voting theory. Since then, different approaches have been employed in order to decide which method is more appropriate to use. The early years of classical voting witnessed an example-based approach adopted by Borda and Condorcet who separately used examples to show the pitfalls of a voting rule, when compared to their own distinct alternative rules [McLean et al. 1995] . Years later, Kenneth Arrow [Arrow 1951; Arrow et al. 2002] adopted a more systematic, principle-based approach by evaluating aggregation rules on the base of satisfying seemingly plausible, "fairness" postulates. Arrow showed the impossibility of satisfying a small set of these postulates together by any aggregation method. This established the superiority of some rules over others, based on subsets of postulates. Thus, in a given scenario, once the desirable postulates are identified, choosing an appropriate rule becomes a systematic task. However, in reality, identifying the desirable postulates in a specific scenario can be subjective, and dependent on complex factors. Aiming to characterize these complex factors, some studies adopted an experiment-based approach [Fiorina and Plott 1978; Forsythe et al. 1996; Guarnaschelli et al. 2000 ; Van der Straeten et al. 2010; Bassi 2015] . These studies established the desirability of some aggregation rules given some assumed conditions from a cognitive perspective.
Aggregation in Contested Domains
In the last two decades, aggregation was studied in different new settings including Judgment Aggregation (JA) [List and Puppe 2009; List 2012; List and Polak 2010; Grossi and Pigozzi 2014] , non-binary JA [Dokow and Holzman 2010b; Dokow and Holzman 2010a] , belief merging [Lin and Mendelzon 1999] , labeling aggregation [Rahwan and Tohmé 2010; Awad et al. 2015; Caminada and Pigozzi 2011; Booth et al. 2014] , and aggregation of annotate linguistic resources [Endriss and Fernández 2013] . While these settings are believed to be closely related, the connection among them and between each of them and the classical voting problem (known as preference aggregation) is not yet fully characterized.
Since the use of arguments provides a more realistic environment to represent the conflict on the Web [Rahwan et al. 2007] , aggregation in the context of argumentation, as is the case with labeling aggregation, provides an appropriate framework. However, similar to other aggregation domains, labeling aggregation can also pose further restrictions to ensure consistence. Consider the following example, which considers making judgments when conflicting information is provided.
Example 1.1 (Suspect Stephen). A committee of 10 jury members was formed to make a collective decision about whether there is evidence against Stephen, a potential suspect. The committee is provided with the arguments that were laid down by the opposing sides, to help them make an informed decision. Understandably, arguments of one side are in conflict with the other side's arguments (refer to Figure 1 (a) ). The relations among arguments, are represented by an argumentation graph, in which nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat relations between arguments (as in Figure 1 (a))).
Each of the ten members is expected to have a reasonable judgement about which arguments should be accepted. Suppose that six out of the ten members believe that argument B should be accepted, and argument C should be rejected (thumbs-up/down above graph in Figure 1 (b) ), while the other four think that argument C should be accepted and argument B should be rejected (thumbsup/down below graph). The question is the following: should the committee collectively accept argument A, thus accepting there is an evidence against Stephen, or not?
The problem highlighted in the previous example encompasses two issues: First, the provided information is inconsistent. For example, one can see that arguments B and C cannot be accepted together. Likewise, the evaluation of argument B influences that of argument A i.e. if B is accepted, then A should be rejected, and vice versa. As such, the evaluation of argument A is influenced by the evaluation of B and C.
Aggregating judgments over such a set of inconsistent information is not as simple as it seems. One can suggest two possible methods: 1) only aggregate evaluations of argument A, and 2) aggregate evaluation of arguments B and C, and use the outcome to determine the collective evaluation of argument A. Applying these two methods on the above outcome provides a similar outcome. Unfortunately, these two methods do not always yield the same outcome, as was shown in [Awad et al. 2015] . In fact, this problem mirrors the discursive dilemma [Pettit 2001 ] in judgement aggregation (JA). Further, choosing between these two methods is not a simple task. There have been many studies discussing the choice between conclusion-based and premise-based methods, the counterparts of the above suggested methods in JA [Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006; Pettit 2001; Pigozzi 2006; Bonnefon 2010] . This suggests the inadequacy of classical voting in handling such problems.
The second issue is concerned with the amount of support needed to collectively make a judgment, and it mirrors the comparison between the majority and the unanimity rules. In the above example, using the majority rule would result in the group concluding that there is evidence against Stephen, while using unanimity would result in the group being undecided about whether there is evidence against Stephen or not. Although the comparison between these two methods has been studied extensively, both formally and experimentally [Guttman 1998; Quesada 2011; Miller and Vanberg 2015] , it has never been studied experimentally in contested domains where conflicting information are considered in making a collective decision.
Abstract Argumentation and Labeling Aggregation Rules
As mentioned earlier, arguments A, B, and C are interrelated, and so judgments on these arguments are dependent. In order to form reasonable judgments on arguments, a formal representation of the relations is needed. Arguments and the relationship between them can be represented as a directed graph in which nodes represent arguments, and arcs between nodes represent binary defeat relations over them. This framework is known as abstract argumentation framework, proposed by Dung [Dung 1995] . In the previous example, one can see that arguments B and C defeat each other, and argument B defeats argument A. Definition 1.2 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework is a pair AF = A, where A is a finite set of arguments and ⊆ A × A is a defeat relation. An argument a defeats an argument b if (a, b) ∈ (sometimes written a b).
For example, in Figure 2 , argument a 1 is defeated by arguments a 2 and a 4 which are, in turn, defeated by arguments a 3 and a 5 . One then can evaluate each argument (i.e. label [Caminada 2006; Caminada and Gabbay 2009 ] each argument) by accepting it (i.e. labeling it as in), rejecting it (i.e. labeling it as out), or being undecided about it (i.e. labeling it as undec). Formally, a labeling is a total function:
be an argumentation framework. An argument labeling is a total function L : A → {in, out, undec}.
This evaluation (or labeling), however, should follow some rules. One of the essential properties, that is common, is the condition of completeness, and is captured, in terms of labelings, in the following two conditions:
(1) An argument is labeled accepted (or in) if and only if all its defeaters are rejected (or out).
(2) An argument is labeled rejected (or out) if and only if at least one of its defeaters is accepted (or in).
In all other cases, an argument should be labeled undecided (or undec). Thus, evaluating a set of arguments amounts to labeling each argument using a labeling function L : A → {in, out, undec} to capture these three possible labels. Any labeling that satisfies the above conditions is a legal labeling, or a complete labeling. These conditions can equivalently be formulated as follows.
Definition 1.4 (Complete labeling). Let AF = A, be an argumentation framework. A complete labeling is a total function L : A → {in, out, undec} such that:
From Example 1.1, one can see that there can be different reasonable positions regarding the evaluation of an argumentation graph (following the previous conditions). Thus, choosing a legal labeling above another becomes a matter of preference. Therefore, in a multi-agent setting, there has been some aggregation rules that were proposed to aggregate preferences over labelings. In [Rahwan and Tohmé 2010; Awad et al. 2015] , the argument-wise plurality rule (AWPR) which chooses the collective label of each argument by plurality, independently from other arguments, was defined and analyzed. On the other hand, Caminada and Pigozzi [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] proposed three operators for aggregating labelings, namely the sceptical operator, the credulous operator, and the super credulous operator. These operators guarantee a compatible outcome, that is, the outcome does not go against the judgment of any individual.
The result of using the two types of operators correspond to the two options discussed above. AWPR supports the idea that a label is chosen if it is submitted by the majority regardless what the minority think, while the Sceptical and (Super) Credulous operators (SSCOs) support the idea that minority's opinion should not be completely ignored.
Analyzing these two types of operators using Arrow's principle-based approach does not provide a clear advantage of one over the other. For example, the following two postulates:
Collective Rationality [Awad et al. 2015] : the output of the aggregation should be a complete labeling.
Compatibility [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] : the collective label of every argument does not go against any individual's label of that argument, where in and out are against each others.
are both satisfied by SSCOs but both violated by AWPR. On the other hand, the following two postulates:
Unanimity [Booth et al. 2014 ]: For each argument, every unanimously agreed upon label is chosen as a collective label.
Independence [Awad et al. 2015] : the collective label of an argument depends only on the votes on that argument.
are both satisfied by AWPR but both violated by SSCOs. Thus, in the absence of specific preferences over these postulates, other contextual factors may promote the social acceptability of one aggregation rule or the other. In the next section, we consider several such contextual factors and tentatively predict their effects, before reporting a test of these predictions, using randomized control experiments, which are the golden standard for doing experimental research.
Hypotheses
First, and as explained in [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] , one of the main advantages of SSCOs is that their (compatible) outcomes can be defended by every individual who took part in the decision. If laypersons perceive this advantage, then experimental manipulations that stress the need for everyone involved to defend the outcome should increase preference for SSCOs against AWPR.
Various such manipulations can be imagined, of which we will test three, from weakest to strongest: a simple reminder of the consequences of the vote; a statement informing participants that each voter is expected to support and defend the group's decision; and a statement informing participants that should the decision of the group prove a mistake, everyone in the group would share responsibility. We deem this last manipulation the strongest because even if group members accept to defend a decision that passed against their vote, they may not be willing to share the blame in case this decision is mistaken. Indeed Ronnegard [Rönnegard 2015] argued that the attribution of moral responsibility to all members of a committee is legitimate when the decision is taken through unanimous voting, while it is not necessarily the case otherwise. Second, the difference between AWPR and SSCOs is mostly about whether to ignore the opinion of the minority or not. Accordingly, people may be more comfortable with AWPR when the minority is very small. To test this hypothesis, we will experimentally manipulate the size of the minority, which will either be small (9 votes to 1) or large (6 votes to 4).
Third, laypersons show a preference for more conservative aggregation procedures when the outcome of the decision may involve the infliction of personal harm, that is, when an individual will incur a cost or a punishment as a consequence of the decision [Bonnefon 2010 ]. Once more, because SSCOs are more conservative than AWPR, then decisions that imply to inflict personal harm should shift preferences towards SSCOs. To test this hypothesis, we will present participants with decisions that do or do not imply to inflict personal harm.
METHOD
A total of 400 participants, all US residents, were recruited from the Crowdflower online platform between March 23rd and May 17th, 2015, and were compensated $0.25 each. Each participant read six vignettes that all featured a committee trying to make a collective decision about a conclusion A. Relevant arguments were listed in each vignette, either two in the case of simple argumentation graphs, or four in the case of complex argumentation graphs (this variable did not impact results, and will not be discussed further). The vignettes displayed how the committee voted on each of these arguments, and the task of the participants was to indicate whether, on the basis of these votes, the committee should accept the conclusion A (the AWPR outcome) or declare itself undecided (the SSCOs outcome). Finally, vignettes explained that were the group to declare itself undecided, the decision would be deferred to another body. Full examples are provided in Appendix C.
Of the six vignettes that participants read, three featured a conclusion A that implied to inflict personal harm upon an individual, and three featured a conclusion A that did not imply such a consequence. For example, one vignette featured the conclusion that a football player should be banned for three games (personal harm), whereas one vignette featured the conclusion that the government should stock up on anti-flu drugs (no personal harm).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight groups of a 2 × 4 between-participant design, manipulating the vote ratio and the framing of the decision. In one vote ratio condition, all arguments supporting A as well as all arguments rejecting counterarguments to A received 6 votes against 4. In the other vote ratio condition, all arguments supporting A as well as all arguments rejecting counterarguments to A received 9 votes against 1. Finally, the framing of the decision came in four treatments. In the Baseline treatment, no information was provided in addition to the above. In the Reminder treatment, one sentence reminded participants of the consequences of accepting A (note that this reminder did not contain any new information). In the Defense treatment, one sentence explained that each member of the committee was expected to support and defend the committee's decision. In the Responsibility treatment, one sentence explained that if the decision of the committee turned out wrong, each member would share the responsibility of this mistake. Figure 3 displays the average proportion of responses favoring plurality, as a function of the decision framing (color-coded), the vote ratio, and whether the decision implied to inflict personal harm. The width of each box in Figure 3 indicates the 95%-confidence interval for these proportions. A box that overlaps with the grey line indicates that participants in this condition did not show a significant preference for either aggregation procedure.
RESULTS
As suggested by Figure 3 , participants showed an overall preference for AWPR. In total, 64% of responses were in line with AWPR, and this proportion was significantly greater than chance in 11 out of 16 experimental conditions-SSCOs, on the other hand, were never significantly preferred in any experimental condition.
The preference for AWPR, though, was qualified by contextual factors. The visual exploration of Figure 3 suggests three main results. First, it seems that the framing of the decision did not significantly affect participants, since the colored boxes are more or less aligned with each other within the four blocks displayed in Figure 3 . Second, it appears that participants were less willing to endorse AWPR in the presence of a large minority, since most of the boxes cross the indifference line in the 6 to 4 condition, whereas none of the boxes cross the indifference line in the 9 to 1 condition. Finally, Figure 3 suggests that participants were less willing to endorse AWPR when the decision implied to inflict personal harm, given the leftward shift of the boxes in the personal harm condition.
These results were confirmed by a mixed-design analysis of variance in which the dependent variable was the proportion of AWPR responses, the between-participant predictors were the vote ratio and the framing condition, and the within-participant predictor was whether the decision implied to inflict personal harm upon an individual. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table I . As expected, the analysis detected a statistically significant effect of the vote ratio (64% of AWPR decisions in the 9 to 1 condition, vs. 58% in the 6 to 4 condition), a statistically significant effect of the infliction of personal harm (59% of AWPR decisions if personal harm, vs. 68% if not), but no effect of the framing of the decision. Post-hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction indicated that none of the treatments differed significantly from the Baseline treatment (all p > .31). Given these results and the statistical power of our analysis (85% power to detect any effect beyond small, i.e., f > .25) we can conclude that even if we had failed to capture a true effect of the framing variable, this effect would likely be small and inconsequential.
DISCUSSION
Formal models of reasoning, argumentation, and decision making can be assessed by intuitions, hypothetical examples and simulations-but also by collecting experimental data in the manner of cognitive psychologists, behavioral economists, and experimental philosophers. Indeed, there is a growing interest in the Artificial Intelligence community for assessing the cognitive, psychological plausibility of formal models of reasoning Amgoud et al. 2005; Benferhat et al. 2005; ]. Here we contributed to this tradition by experimentally identifying the contexts in which human participants would display a preference for SSCOs (aggregation rules that aim at producing compatible outcomes) versus AWPR (the counterpart to the plurality rule in the domain of argumentation). Our results suggested that AWPR was the generally preferred rule, except in situations where (1) the decision implied to inflict personal harm to an individual, and (2) the vote would pass by a narrow margin. The presence of each of these two factors decreased the preference for AWPR, and their joint presence led people to hesitate between AWPR and SSCOs. However, and interestingly given previous arguments for using SSCOs, (3) we did not observe an increased preference for SSCOs in situations where all committee members were to defend or take responsibility for the committee's collective decision, independently of their own vote. We now discuss in turn these three findings.
The fact that participants were less likely to endorse AWPR for decisions that would result in the infliction of harm to an individual is consistent with previous results showing that people prefer more conservative voting rules in such circumstances [Bonnefon 2007; Bonnefon 2010] . This effect may reflect a concern with avoiding costly, unfair false alarms [List 2006 ], or the emotional saliency of an identified victim [Kogut and Ritov 2006] , but its psychological underpinnings are outside the scope of this article. As a consequence of this finding, though, it may be useful to search for novel voting rules which people deem desirable when they have to deliberate on a personal punishment. Indeed, while we observed that the desirability of AWPR decreased in these circumstances, we did not observe a full switch to a preference for SSCOs.
We also observed that participants were less comfortable with AWPR when the vote would pass by a narrow margin (6 to 4 vs. 9 to 1 in our experiment). This result is not surprising: Given that AWPR effectively ignores the opinion of the minority, it makes sense that people are more comfortable with it when the minority that is ignored is small. The applied consequences of this finding are limited, though. Indeed, shifting to SSCOs when the vote is expected to be a close call essentially amounts to deciding in advance that no decision will be reached.
More importantly, we found no evidence for one purportedly central advantage of SSCOs, that is, their greater desirability when all voters are held accountable (or even responsible) for the committee's decision, independently of their own vote. Participants appeared willing to vote according to AWPR even in these circumstances. One explanation for this finding is that the plurality principle at the heart of AWPR is natural enough to appear justified in most situations. Another possibility is that participants weighted against each other the inconvenience for some to defend a decision they opposed, to the inconvenience for all to defend an indecision nobody voted for. Indeed, if D o is the inconvenience of defending a decision that one opposed, and D u is the inconvenience of defending an undecided verdict when one was not undecided, then it might be rational to prefer AWPR when
where N is the total number of voters and m is the number of voters in the minority. For example, in the case of a 6 to 4 vote, it might still be rational (at least from a utilitarian perspective) to apply AWPR when the inconvenience of defending indecision is at least four tenth of the inconvenience of defending the position that one voted against.
In sum, we have reported the first experimental investigation of the contextual factors that may lead human voters to lean toward SSCOS or AWPR aggregation procedures. Although we observed a general preference for AWPR, this preference was moderated by contextual factors. We found null evidence against one important prior claim (SSCOs are good when everyone is expected to defend the collective decision), positive evidence for a vote ratio effect (people like AWPR better when the minority is small), and positive evidence for a moral effect (people like AWPR less when they deliberate about inflicting personal harm to an individual). Future research will identify the psychological mechanisms underlying these preferences, but also the voting rules that people may approve of in situations (e.g., personal harm plus narrow margin) where they seem unsatisfied with AWPR and SSCOs both.
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APPENDIX

A. LABELING AGGREGATION METHODS
For this appendix, we write in(L), out(L), and undec(L) for the set of arguments that are labeled in, out, and undec respectively by labeling L. A labeling L can be represented as L = (in(L),out(L),undec(L)). Equivalently, we also denote a labeling L as: L = {(A, l)|L(A) = l for all A ∈ A, l ∈ {in, out, undec}}.
The problem of labeling aggregation can be formulated as a set of individuals that collectively decide how an argumentation framework AF = A, must be labelled.
Definition A.1 (Labeling aggregation problem [Awad et al. 2015] ). Let Ag = {1, . . . , n} be a finite non-empty set of agents, and AF = A, be an argumentation framework. A labeling aggregation problem is a pair LAP = Ag, AF .
Each individual i ∈ Ag has a labeling L i which expresses the evaluation of AF by this individual. A labeling profile is an |Ag|-tuple of labelings.
Definition A.2 (Labeling profile [Awad et al. 2015] ). Let LAP = Ag, AF be a labeling aggregation problem. We use L = (L 1 , . . . , L n ) ∈ L(AF) |Ag| to denote a labeling profile, where L(AF) is the class of labelings of AF. Additionally, we use L(a) to denote the labeling profile (i.e. an |Ag|-tuple) of an argument a
The aggregation of individuals' labelings can be defined as a partial function. 1 Definition A.3 (Aggregation function [Awad et al. 2015] ). Let LAP = Ag, AF be a labeling aggregation problem. An aggregation function for LAP is a function F :
A.1. The Argument-Wise Plurality Rule
The Argument-Wise Plurality Rule (AWPR) M was proposed in [Rahwan and Tohmé 2010; Awad et al. 2015] . Intuitively, for each argument, it selects the label that appears most frequently in the individual labelings.
Definition A.4 (Argument-Wise Plurality Rule (AWPR) [Awad et al. 2015] ). Let AF = A, be an argumentation framework. Given any argument a ∈ A and any profile
Note that M is defined for all profiles that cause no ties, i.e. M(L) is defined iff there does not exist any argument a ∈ A for which we have at least two labels l a and l a with l a = l a and
A.2. Sceptical and (Super) Credulous Operators (SSCOs)
The three aggregation operators, namely the Sceptical, the Credulous and the Super Credulous, were defined in [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] . In their work, a labeling profile is represented as a set, since the number of votes for each label is irrelevant (as long as it is not zero) for these operators. For convenience, we will assume here that the labeling profile is a tuple (as in Def. A.2).
Crucial to the definitions of the three operators are the notions of less or equally committed and compatible. A labeling L 1 is said to be less or equally committed than another labeling L 2 if and only if every argument that is labeled in by L 1 is also labeled in by L 2 and every argument that is labeled out by L 1 is also labeled out by L 2 .
Definition A.5 (Less or equally committed [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] ). Let L 1 and L 2 be two labelings of argumentation framework AF = A, .
Two labelings L 1 and L 2 are said to be compatible with each other if and only if for every argument, there is no in − out conflict between the two. In other words, every argument that is labeled in by L 1 is not labeled out by L 2 and every argument that is labeled out by L 1 is not labeled in by L 2 .
Definition A.6 (Compatible labelings ≈ [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] ). Let L 1 and L 2 be two labelings of argumentation framework AF = A, . We say that L 1 is compatible with
The following two definitions are used in the definition of the operators:
Definition A.7 (Initial operators , [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] ). The sceptical initial and credulous initial operators are labeling aggregation operators defined as the following:
Definition A.8 (Down-admissible ↓ and up-complete ↑ labelings [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] ). Let L be a labeling of argumentation framework AF = A, . The down-admissible labeling of L, denoted as L↓, is the biggest element of the set of all admissible labelings that are less or equally committed than L. The up-complete labeling of L, denoted as L↑, is the smallest element of the set of all complete labelings that are bigger or equally committed than L.
Where complete labelings are labelings that satify the three conditions in Def. 1.4, admissible labelings are labelings that satisfy the first two conditions of Def. 1.4, and biggest and smallest are defined as with respect to Def. A.5. Now, we provide the definition of the three operators:
Definition A.9 (SSCOs: so AF , co AF and sco AF [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] ). Given an argumentation framework AF, the sceptical so AF , the credulous co AF and the super credulous sco AF operators are labeling aggregation operators defined as the following:
A.3. Postulates
Inspired by Arrow's principle-based approach, many postulates were defined in the context of argumentation. Most of these postulates are similar to the ones proposed in Judgment Aggregation. We provide here the formal definition of the four postulates that were mentioned in the introduction. Collective rationality requires that any possible outcome of the aggregation rule has to be a complete labeling.
Collective Rationality [Awad et al. 2015 
where Comp(AF) is the set of all possible complete labelings for the argumentation framrework AF. Compatibility requires that the collective label of each argument is compatible (w.r.t Def. A.6) with the label by every individual for that argument.
Compatibility [Caminada and Pigozzi 2011] For all i ∈ Ag and a ∈ A we have
Unanimity requires that for each argument, every unanimously agreed upon label is chosen as a collective label.
Unanimity [Booth et al. 2014] For each a ∈ A, if there is some x ∈ {in, out, undec}
Finally, independence requires that the collective label of an argument depends only on the votes on that argument.
Independence [Awad et al. 2015 
B. ARGUMENT SETS
Following, are the six stories that were used in the experiment. The argumentation structure representing the first three is shown in Figures 4 and the one representing the other three is shown in Figure 5 . Figure 4) 2 3 Fig. 4 . A simple argumentation graph with the three possible complete labelings. Nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat relations. The color white refers to in, the color black refers to out, and the color gray refers to undec.
B.1. Simple AF (shown in
(1) Argument set 1 -Argument from Knowledge Context: A governmental committee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the government should stock up on medicines against the Mexican flu or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
-A: The expert virologist says that Mexican flu is a threatening pandemic. Therefore, the government should stock up on medicines against the Mexican flu. -B: This expert has a financial interest in companies making the medicines, according to some journalists. Therefore, his advice cannot be relied upon. -C: This expert does not have a financial interest in the companies making the medicines, according to his employer. Therefore, his advice can be relied upon. (2) Argument set 2 -Argument from Analogy, Classification and Precedent Context: A school committee of 10 teachers gathered to make a collective decision about whether the school should have a uniform or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the school principal who will form another committee.
-A: After the Central Public School forced students to have a uniform, the attendance of students increased. Therefore, we should have a uniform in our school. -B: There can be other factors that contributed to the effect of uniform on attendance. Their case might be different from ours.
-C: We share the same entry standards with the Central Public School and our student's families have similar socio-economic status to theirs. 2 (3) Argument set 3 -Argument from Knowledge Context: A hiring committee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether a specific candidate is worthy of a good offer or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be postponed to get further reference letters.
-A: The candidate's former adviser provided a strong recommendation letter. Therefore, this candidate is worthy of a good offer. -B: It is in the adviser's interest that her former student gets a good position. Therefore, she is probably over-selling him. -C: The adviser knows she can lose her credibility if the candidate is not as good as she claims. Figure 5) 2 3 Fig. 5 . A non-simple argumentation graph with three possible complete labelings. Nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat relations. The color white refers to in, the color black refers to out, and the color gray refers to undec.
B.2. Non-Simple AF (shown in
(1) Argument set 1 -Argument from Knowledge Context: A committee of 10 jury members gathered to make a collective decision about whether there is evidence against Stephen or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the judge who will form another committee.
-A: The witness saw Stephen in the parking area next to the crime scene. Therefore, there is evidence against Stephen. -B: It was dark then. Therefore, the witness probably mistook someone else for Stephen. -C: The parking area is well lit. Therefore, the witness could clearly identify Stephen. -D: The witness hates Stephen. Therefore, the witness is biased. -E: The witness did not know Stephen well. Therefore, the witness is unbiased. (2) Argument set 2 -Argument from Knowledge Context: A group of 10 employees were assigned the task of making a collective decision about whether the company's next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the senior management who will form another committee.
-A: The travel agent recommended visiting Niagara Falls. Therefore, the next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls. -B: The travel agent has never been to Niagara Falls. Therefore, we cannot trust his recommendation. -C: The travel agent has organized many trips to Niagara Falls before. Therefore, we can trust his recommendation.
-D: The travel agent recommended visiting a place with natural attractions citing Niagara Falls as an example. He did not specifically recommend Niagara Falls. -E: The travel agent specifically recommended visiting Niagara Falls citing its natural attractions as the main reason. (3) Argument set 3 -Argument from Analogy, Classification and Precedent Context: A referees committee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the footballer Marconi should be banned for three matches or not. Your job is to determine rules for how they will aggregate their votes. In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
-A: Player Marconi criticized the referee via his official Twitter account. In a previous incident, the footballer Borello was banned for three matches for publicly criticizing the referee. Therefore, Marconi should be banned for three matches. -B: Borello criticized the referee in a press conference. That was a different case. That was a similar case. -E: Zotti's criticism was less direct than the criticism by Marconi and Borello.
C.2. Simple AF, Case: ratio 9 : 1, reminder, Scenario: Uniform ID: 229 A school committee of 10 teachers gathered to make a collective decision about whether the school should have a uniform or not. Consider the following main argument:
-A: After the Central Public School forced students to have a uniform, the attendance of students increased. Therefore, we should have a uniform in our school.
In considering argument A, the following arguments need to be taken into account:
-B: There can be other factors that contributed to the effect of uniform on attendance. Their case might be different from ours. -C: We share the same entry standards with the Central Public School and our student's families have similar socioeconomic status to theirs.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept ("Yes") or reject ("No") each of the two arguments B and C.
No. of Votes B C 9
No Yes 1
Yes No
Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments. Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. The options are:
(1) The group conclude that the school should have a uniform.
[This will add extra costs on the students' parents' side] (2) The group is undecided about whether the school should have a uniform or not.
[In this case, the decision will be deferred to the school principal who will form another committee] C.3. Complex AF, Case: ratio 9 : 1, defending, Scenario: Marconi ID: 169 A referees committee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the footballer Marconi should be banned for three matches or not. Consider the following main argument:
-A: Player Marconi criticized the referee via his official Twitter account. In a previous incident, the footballer Borello was banned for three matches for publicly criticizing the referee. Therefore, Marconi should be banned for three matches.
-B: Borello criticized the referee in a press conference. That was a different case.
-C: Both cases are similar in what it matters.
-D: In another previous incident, the footballer Zotti criticized a referee and got away with it. That was a similar case. -E: Zotti's criticism was less direct than the criticism by Marconi and Borello.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept ("Yes") or reject ("No") each of the four arguments B, C, D, and E. Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments. Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. The options are:
(1) The group conclude that Marconi should be banned for three matches.
(2) The group is undecided about whether Marconi should be banned for three matches or not.
In case the committee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
Note that once a collective decision is made, each committee member is expected to support and defend it. It may be awkward for a committee member who disagrees with the group conclusion to defend it to others.
C.4. Complex AF, Case: ratio 6 : 4, responsibility, Scenario: Excursion ID: 356 A group of 10 employees were assigned the task of making a collective decision about whether the company's next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls or not. Consider the following main argument:
-A: The travel agent recommended visiting Niagara Falls. Therefore, the next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls.
-B: The travel agent has never been to Niagara Falls. Therefore, we cannot trust his recommendation.
-C: The travel agent has organized many trips to Niagara Falls before. Therefore, we can trust his recommendation.
-D: The travel agent recommended visiting a place with natural attractions citing Niagara Falls as an example. He did not specifically recommend Niagara Falls. -E: The travel agent specifically recommended visiting Niagara Falls citing its natural attractions as the main reason.
(1) The group conclude that the company's next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls.
[If this decision turned out to be wrong, each member would share the responsibility for this mistake] (2) The group is undecided about whether the company's next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls or not.
[In this case, the decision will be deferred to the senior management who will form another committee]
